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A MERICANS are taking their problems to the court house in
greater numbers than ever before. During 1983, new civil case
filings in the United States district courts increased 14.3% over 1982
and totaled 255,546.1 These new filings left the federal courts with
the largest pending caseload in their history. 2 This trend challenges
the dispute management skills of judges. Unless judges respond dy-
namically to the problems posed by their ever-expanding dockets,
3
the public's confidence in America's legal system will decline.
4
Although traditional procedures, including the jury trial, con-
tinue to be essential to the resolution of certain cases, experience dem-
t United States District Judge, Northern District of Ohio. J.D., Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, 1952.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 7 (1983). In 1982, 212,494 cases were filed in the
United States district courts. Id. Criminal filings during 1983 increased 11.6%, going
from 32,401 cases filed in 1982 to 33,852 cases filed in 1983. Id. at 15.
2. Id at 11. Between 1982 and 1983 the pending case load of the federal district
courts increased by 14.7%, going from 217,624 cases pending in 1982 to 246,863 cases
pending in 1983. Id.
Chief Justice Burger, in his 1982 report on the state of the judiciary, noted that
the average case load per federal district judge nearly doubled between 1940 and
1981, going from 190 cases in 1940 to 350 cases in 1981. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). The Chief Justice also noted that the experience
of federal appellate judges has been similar to that of the district judges: between
1950 and 1981 the average caseload of federal appellate judges went from 44 cases
per judge to 200 cases per judge. Id.
3. According to one scholar's calculations, "by the early 21st century the federal
appellate courts alone will decide approximately 1 million cases each year. That
bench would include over 5,000 active judges, and the Federal Reporter would ex-
pand by more than 1,000 volumes each year." Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27
STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975). But see Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D.
111 (1976). In response to Professor Barton's calculations, Professor Sander
remarked,
I believe that one should view these dire predictions with a healthy skepti-
cism. Litigation rates, like population rates, cannot be assumed to grow
ineluctably, unaffected by a variety of social factors. Nor should it be as-
sumed that there will be no human intervention that could dramatically
affect the accuracy of Professor Barton's projections.
Id at 111 (footnote omitted).
4. Chief Justice Burger has stated that "[i]f the courts are to retain public confi-
dence, we cannot let disputes wait two, three, or five years to be disposed of, as is so
often the situation." Burger, supra note 2, at 276.
(1363)
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onstrates that a large percentage of cases can be settled fairly and
efficiently through judge-guided alternative methods of dispute reso-
lution.5 In contrast to the alternative methods of dispute resolution
employed solely by private parties,6 judicially-managed alternatives
supplement, rather than replace, the traditional processes of civil liti-
gation. As with most other alternatives to the traditional civil litiga-
tion process, judically-supervised alternatives are valuable because
they foster case settlements. Judicially-supervised alternatives are
particularly effective because of the unique position of the judge: only
the judge commands the court resources and the disinterested per-
spective necessary to efficiently and consistently guide parties toward
fair settlements of substantial disputes.
This article explores judicially-managed alternatives to the tradi-
tional procedures of civil litigation. It will analyze some of the factors
that have motivated judges and litigants to seek alternatives to tradi-
tional civil procedures. The article will then describe two judicially-
managed alternative methods of dispute resolution: 1) the appoint-
ment of neutral experts and special masters, and 2) the summary jury
trial.
II. ORIGINS OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Initially, it must be recognized that the vast increase in litigation
in the United States was, and is, to be expected. If one considers the
complexity of interpersonal and business relationships in modern soci-
ety, one can see that this mass of litigation is not a new problem, but
simply a compounding of a familiar facet of human experience.
Throughout history, society has developed and implemented methods
for meeting and resolving disputes as the disputes arose. 7 As society
became more complex, disputes and dispute resolution techniques
also became more complex. It is from this process that our present
system has evolved. It is because of this ability to meet the challenges
of a changing society that our system endures.
Over the past several years many alternative methods of dispute
resolution have been developed. 8 Concurrently, many commentators
5. See note 8 infa.
6. See note 12 it'fra.
7. See generally G. ARCHER, HISTORY OF THE LAW (1928) (traces the history of
law from the Code of Hammurabi (2200 B.C.) to America in the nineteenth century);
P. EDMUNDS, LAW AND CIVILIZATION (1959).
8. See, e.g., Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 611, 618, 622-24 (1981) (recent alternatives to the traditional court framework
include (1) screening panels to evaluate merits of medical malpractice claims, (2) a
1364 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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have engaged in extensive comparative analyses of the various alter-
natives.9 Typically, these commentators describe the characteristics
of various alternative methods of dispute resolution and then state
which alternative is best. 10 It is my view that altogether too much
time and energy have been devoted to such debates. Accordingly,
this article presupposes a working knowledge of alternative methods
of dispute resolution and does not provide a description of the current
state of the art. Instead, it focuses on certain factors that have made
the two alternative methods advocated in this article particularly
effective.
The goal of any judicially-managed alternative method of dis-
pute resolution is to foster settlements and thereby obviate trials.
This goal is often accomplished by providing a reasonably accurate
forecast of trial outcomes."I A common element among most alterna-
tive methods of dispute resolution is that they involve a neutral indi-
procedure combining mediation with economic inducement to settle tort cases where
liability not in issue, and (3) neighborhood justice centers); Lambros and Shunk, The
SummatyJuy Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980) (condensed version of jury trial
affording litigants opportunity to evaluate jury reponse, then decide whether to settle
or proceed with full trial); Parker & Radoff, The Mini-Heanng." An Alternative to Pro-
tracted Litigation of Factually Complex Disputes, 38 Bus. LAW. 35, 35 (1982) ("abbreviated
litigation process by which litigants present their respective positions, in condensed
form but at a meaningful level of detail, with view to reaching negotiated settle-
ment"); Note, The Caliornia Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considera-
tions of Pay-as-you-go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592, 1592 (1981) (referee selected and
paid by litigants and empowered by statute to enter decisions having same final effect
as trial court judgments).
Although arbitration is not a recent development in dispute resolution, legisla-
tures have found novel applications such as Pennsylvania's compulsory arbitration
scheme, which requires arbitration for most civil cases where damages claimed are
not in excess of $20,000. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(a)-(b) (Purdon 1982).
9. See generally THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982) (analysis
of informal dispute resolution systems world-wide); CENTER FOR PUBLIC RE-
SOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1982, MH-16-17 (chart comparing
Adjudication, Arbitration, Mediation/Conciliation, Traditional Negotiation, and
Mini-Trial). See also Breger, The Justice Conundrum, 28 VILL. L. REV. 923, 938-55
(1983); Ryan, Lipety, Luskin & Neubauer, Analyzing Court Delay Reduction Programs:
Why do Some Succeed?, 65 JUDICATURE 58 (1981).
10. For a politically oriented comparison and critique of informal dispute reso-
lution systems found throughout the world, see THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUS-
TICE, supra note 9. See also, Breger, supra note 9, at 938-47; Garth, The Movement Toward
Procedural Informalism in North America and Western Europe." A Critical Survey, in 2 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 183 (R. Abel ed. 1982).
11. Cf Parker & Radoff, supra note 8. The summary jury trial is a somewhat
formal proceeding which offers one-time disputants an accurate prediction of trial
outcome. For a discussion of the summary jury trial, see notes 36-40 and accompany-
ing text infra. Minitrials and minihearings, on the other hand, are not designed to
provide accurate trial forecasts. Instead, they are intended to resolve promptly dis-
putes between parties having continuous business relations. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC
RESOURCES, MINITRIAL HANDBOOK (E. Green ed. 1982); Parker & Radoff, supra
note 8, at 35-36.
1983-84] 1365
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vidual.12 The credibility that the disputants place in the result of the
alternative process is a direct function of the confidence they have in
the person administering the process. To produce an effective result,
an alternative must demonstrate and employ the basic rudiments of
fairness, which are the very essence of our court system. Thus, no
method of disute resolution will function efficiently unless the dispu-
tants have a high level of confidence in the neutral individual oversee-
ing the process.
Several commentators have attributed the success rate of many
alternatives to the coercive nature of the judicial process and the dis-
putants' fear of having to resort to the courts.' 3 One reason various
alternative methods are effective is that the disputants realize that an
unresolved dispute may result in trial. The motivation behind such
settlements is mischaracterized, however, when one asserts that the
12. The use of a neutral individual to supervise dispute-resolution has been
deemed "essential." Olson, Dispute Resolution." An Alternative for Large Case Litigation,
LITIG., Winter, 1980, at 22, 24. But see Parker & Radoff, supra note 8, at 43 ("under
some circumstances the benefits of a minihearing may be obtained without the addi-
tional expense and possible delay that may result from the introduction of a neutral
adviser"). The role of the neutral party in alternative forms of dispute resolution
ranges from that of passive moderator to final arbiter of both law and fact. For
example, the mediator's role is to persuade the parties to conform themselves to the
rules, rather than order them to do so. See Fuller, Medaton - Its Forms and Functions,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971). Professor Fuller explains that
the mediator can direct [the parties'] verbal exchanges away from recrimi-
nation and toward the issues that need to be faced, [and] by receiving sepa-
rate and confidential communications from the parties he can gradually
bring into the open issues so deep-cutting that the parties themselves had
shared a tacit taboo against any discussion of them and that, finally, he can
by his management of the interchange demonstrate to the parties that it is
possible to discuss divisive issues without either rancor or evasion.
Id at 309.
The neutral advisor in a minihearing or minitrial plays a more active role with
respect to the outcome of the dispute. See Parker & Radoff, supra note 8, at 43. The
neutral advisor in this form of dispute resolution furnishes the parties with a non-
binding evaluation of the merits in addition to supervising the process. Id For other
discussion of the role of the neutral advisor, see generally CENTER FOR PUBLIC RE-
SOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (1982); Green, Marks & Olsen, Set-
thng Large Case Litigation. An Alternative Approach, 11 LOYOLA L. REV. 493, 503 (1978).
In binding arbitration, the arbitrator renders a decision which binds the parties
unless the statutory criteria for judicial modification are met. See, e.g., Novoseller v.
Royal Globe Ins. Cos., - Pa. Super. _, 463 A.2d 1163 (1983) (interpreting 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7315 (Purdon 1982)) (statute precludes modification of arbitra-
tor's decision unless arbitrator misapplied the law).
13. L. Hand, The Deictiencies of Trial to Reach the Heart of the Matter, reprinted in 3
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 89 (1926). Judge Learned Hand commented, "I must
say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of
sickness and death." Id at 105. See also Nejelski, The Small Claims and Access toJustce -
Dispute Resolution: Trends and Issues, 20 ALBERTA L. REV. 314 (1982). Former Third
Circuit Executive Paul Nejelski has characterized the prospect of courtroom litiga-
tion: "A firm trial date is a 'Doomsday machine' which forces the parties and their
lawyers to prepare the case simultaneously and hopefully resolve it." Id at 323.
1366 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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judicial system is a coercive and feared process. It is important to
recognize that the judicial process is not inherently intimidating or
coercive. Courts do not nullify the free will of litigants. Courts de-
mand accountability, however. At some point in the judicial process,
a litigant must present proof in support of a claim. To prepare and
present such proof may be an expensive and time-consuming task.
1 4
It is this high cost of litigation which often governs the decision to
settle. Rather than arising from some form of inherent coercion or
fear, the decision is a voluntary one, based on the disputants' balanc-
ing of a wide variety of factors, including cost, time, and uncertainty
of results.
Several writers have suggested that America's court system
should be replaced by a system that can resolve disputes more effi-
ciently.' 5 These writers, however, fail to recognize that the American
public continues to rely on its court system as its primary system for
resolving disputes. Notwithstanding the current focus on the costly
and time-consuming nature of litigation, the public's confidence in
the ability of the judicial system to render just and equitable results
remains high. 16 Because of this enduring public confidence in the ju-
14. See Perritt, "And the Whole Earth Was of One Language"--A Broad View of Dir-
pute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1221 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 9, at 947-55. Professor Breger concludes his article
by stating that "[flinding the balance between efficiency and fairness values is the
conundrum of modern judicial administration .... ." Id at 955. Professor Breger
points out that in order to compensate for the current imbalance resulting from the
dramatic increase in litigation, many reformers advocate "an effort to divert appro-
priate cases to informal fora." Id. at 947. The minitrial, Breger notes, has the power
to be a particularly effective alternative to formal litigation. Id at 952-53. Beyond
alternative procedures for dispute resolution, Professor Breger recommends develop-
ment of a legal system that minimizes the need for complex legal interpretation. He
explains that "minor changes in probate law could remove all but the most complex
estates from judicial purview. The morass of government regulation should be
scourged with an Occan's razor honed to select the simpler regulatory alternatives."
Id at 955. Lawrence Cooke, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, simi-
larly calls for alternatives to the traditional judicial mechanism. See Cooke, supra note
8. Observing that the overcrowded court "has become a beleagured institution,"
Chief Judge Cooke continued: "Just as byways divert the flow of traffic from the
highways, secondary systems of dispute resolution should be used to reduce the de-
mands placed upon the traditional court system." Id at 612. It should be noted that
Chief Judge Cooke tempers his progressive recommendation with a call for tradition:
"the major portion of the case flow should be directed through the highway of the
courts . . . ." Id at 631-32.
16. See Brink, Improving Our Justice System Through Alternatives, 68 A.B.A. J. 384
(1982). Commenting on the need for alternative means of dispute resolution, David
R. Brink, President of the American Bar Association, observed that
[the] movement toward dispute resolution outside court, in a broad range of
cases, does not disparage the role of courts and lawyers. Many disputes,
rights, and issues of our time can be resolved only by our judicial system.
But that system can function even better if it is freed of matters that choke
13671983-84]
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diciary, judges must play a central role in the development and im-
plementation of effective alternative methods of dispute resolution. If
judges play an effective role in the development of alternatives to the
traditional jury trial, they can aid in the efficient resolution of dis-
putes without impairing the ability of courts to provide their tradi-
tional services.
Although the public's confidence in the judicial system contin-
ues, recent criticisms of the costs and delays associated with litigation
have tended to erode that confidence. There is no question that the
workload of the American judiciary is increasing at an alarming
rate. 17 Many have questioned the ability and competency of the
courts to manage effectively the deluge of litigation."' For example, a
recent editorial concluded: "Public opinion polls show that as the cost
of finding justice has accelerated, trust in the court system has
dropped."' 9 Consequently, to maintain the public's confidence in our
judicial system, judges must focus on resolving the problem of exces-
sive delays and escalating costs. Failure to do so may result in the
declining relevance of judicial systems in the United States. One
commentator summarized the problem in these terms:
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the danger is not
that the rule of law will formally end, but that it will be-
come increasingly irrelevant. Unless American legal institu-
tions are remade to meet the needs of the community, they
will be, not eliminated, but bypassed by growing segments
of the society.
History confirms that courts which become bywords of in-
competence may continue formally in full dress and cere-
mony - but the society finds means of carrying on its
business without them. [Eminent nineteenth-century jurist
and historian Frederic W.] Maitland pointed out that, at
the end of Queen Mary's reign, "the judges had nothing to
do but 'to look about them.' "The inadequacies of the com-
mon law and the expense and delay involved in lawsuits
had led the bulk of the community to avoid the courts at all
its facilities, either through the sheer volume of simple claims or the occa-
sional complex case that can occupy it for months or years. Id at 384.
17. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
18. See, e.g., Bell, Crises in the Courts. Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3
(1978). Former United States Attorney General Bell states that "the quality ofjustice
dispensed by our federal court system is beginning to deteriorate, and unless checked,
this deterioration will accelerate." Id at 5.
19. USA Today, Jan. 6, 1984, at 10A, col. 1.
1368 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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This is not an acceptable prediction of the fate of judicial systems in
the United States. The American judiciary has the ability to meet
the challenge of the increase in its workload. The judiciary must ex-
plore and adopt alternative methods of dispute resolution.
In 1970, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger asked the district judges
of the United States for suggestions to improve the judicial system. In
response to the Chief Justice's inquiry, I stated:
[W]e must find ways to resolve controversies before they be-
come involved in the complex adversary judicial machinery.
Methods must be examined which can effectively deal with
disputes administratively and arbitratively but under judi-
cial supervision and before formal litigation is
commenced.
2'
In his 1983 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, the Chief Justice ex-
pressly recognized the need for the judicial system to implement
alternatives:
Experimentation with new methods in the judicial system is
imperative given growing caseloads, delays, and increasing
costs. Federal and state judges throughout the country are
trying new approaches to discovery, settlement negotiations,
trial and alternatives to trial that deserve commendation
and support. The bar should work with judges who are at-
tempting to make practical improvements in the judicial
system. Greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness serve both
clients and the public. Legal educators and scholars can
provide a valuable service by studying new approaches and
reporting on successful innovations that can serve as models
for other jurisdictions, and on experiments that do not sur-
vive the scrutiny of careful testing.
22
The traditional role judges have played in dispute resolution has
varied from judge to judge. While bench, bar, and society have dif-
fering perceptions of what this role has been and should be, all are
concerned with the judge's effectiveness in disposing of disputes. Ad-
20. B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 362-63 (1974). Accord Belli, The Law's
Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay b? Civil Ltigation, 8 J. LEGIS. 16 (1981) (unless legis-
latures respond to the overload of litigation, the judicial system may deteriorate to
the point where "laymen will be tempted to circumvent the legal process entirely").
21. Letter from Hon. Thomas D. Lambros to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, at
6 (May 28, 1970)(available from Villanova University Law School Library).
22. W. BURGER, 1983 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 17-18.
1983-84] 1369
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ditionally, all agree that the pretrial process facilitates efficient dispo-
sition of disputes.
23
Some judges control their dockets with a heavy hand, by strongly
suggesting that parties settle. Many such judges earn this reputation
by imposing strict time tables in an attempt to achieve settlement
through the force of rigid litigation schedules. Others, however, sim-
ply have an innate talent for resolving cases before trial without
resorting to pressure tactics. Still other judges seem to approach set-
tlement in a passive manner, choosing to play no role other than the
final arbiter if the parties cannot work out a settlement on their own.
Each of these approaches to settlement is appropriate in particular
cases. The judge must use his ability and discretion to decide which
of these paths, if any, should be followed in any particular dispute.
Lawyers also employ different pretrial techniques to facilitate
settlement. Some seek an early settlement, while others play out their
hands to the end - often the day of trial. In the background of all
pretrial proceedings, however, the trial looms. Lawyers and litigants
all want to avoid this moment. This is evidenced by the large per-
centage of settlements that occur just prior to trial.
24
Today, there are serious questions with respect to the judge's
participation in the pretrial mechanism. A primary concern is
whether the judge has sufficient power and resources to keep from
being overwhelmed by the backlog of cases. In an effort to improve
the settlement process, some scholars have endeavored to develop
mathematical formulas to predict the fair settlement value of a case.
These scholars have recognized that a touchstone on the road to bet-
ter settlements is the minimization of attorneys' impulsive assessments
of case values.2 5 Judges must play a more tangible role in the elimi-
23. See generally Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre- Trial Procedure, 36
MICH. L. REV. 215 (1937) (examining the historical development of pretrial
procedures).
24. In excess of 90% of civil actions are settled by negotiation, although settle-
ments often come on the eve of the trial. See Smith & St. John, Negotiation and Settle-
ment, LITIG., Fall 1978, at 7. See also R. L. SIMMONS, WINNING BEFORE TRIAL: How
TO PREPARE CASES FOR THE BEST SETTLEMENT OR TRIAL RESULT 712-15 (1974)
(providing a formula for determining the "fair settlement value" of a lawsuit); Green-
burg, The Lawyer's Use of Quantitative Analysis in Settlement Negotiations, 38 Bus. LAW.
1557 (1983) (advocating the use of mathematical techniques to determine, in ad-
vance of trial, the expected value of an action in order to assess settlement offers).
25. See generally Greenburg, supra note 24. In his article, Ronald David Green-
burg explains the potential for such formulas:
The use of quantitative techniques and terminology in legal counseling
would also encourage lawyers to move beyond such shibboleths as "Litiga-
tion is expensive, and thus settlement may well be the best alternative." All
clients, and especially business executives, understand that the cost of litiga-
tion is high, and for that very reason they seek the lawyer's expert estimate
1370 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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nation of such impulsive assessments. They must assist litigants in
their efforts to ascertain the fair settlement value of cases.
A major goal of any judge who participates in alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution is to predict for the disputants how a jury
will decide the pending action. Predicting the outcome of a trial,
however, is not unlike forecasting the weather: both serve valuable
functions, and each is accomplished with a recognized margin of er-
ror. The goal of the judge, like that of a meteorologist, is to reduce
that margin of error. While no predictions of what might go on in the
minds of jurors can be foolproof, some level of accuracy is possible. In
forming a prediction, the judge should consider the many variables
involved, including jurors' biases, prejudices, and attitudes, as well as
the deliberation process itself. When the judge and counsel weigh
these variables and formulate proposals based on such analysis, they
have achieved the very essence of informed pretrial bargaining and
negotiation.
2 6
Based on this foundation, I have recently begun to employ two
valuable alternative methods of dispute resolution which help liti-
gants to predict trial outcomes more accurately. In 1980, I invented
the summary jury trial.2 7 More recently, I have begun to retain neu-
tral advisors and special masters in order to streamline pretrial pro-
ceeding in complex cases.
28
III. JUDGE-GUIDED ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
A. Special Masters And Neutral Advisors
Drawing from the Rules of Equity, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit the court to appoint special masters to assist the
court in any matter.29 The court can limit the order appointing the
master by specifying the functions to be performed or by requiring
of when it would be advantageous to settle out of court. The lawyer's best
guess on a quantitative analysis of the elements of the dispute and the time
value of money to a particular client is far better than his guess based on
intuition alone.
Id at 1580.
26. For a discussion of predictions of trial outcome as an inducement to settle-
ment, see Perritt, supra note 13, at 1256 n.101.
27. See genera/ly Lambros and Shunk, supra note 8. For a discussion of the sum-
mary jury trial, see notes 36-40 and accompanying text infra.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (authorizing appointment of special masters).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). The Advisory Committee notes reveal that rule 53 is
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the master to report only on special issues.30
The appointment of special masters should be the exception and
not the rule.31 Exceptions in which the court is warranted in ap-
pointing a special master include complicated cases and cases involv-
ing exceptional issues. 32 When the courts do appoint special masters,
their assistance is generally a tremendous asset to the court and the
litigants. This is so because special masters can assist in developing
both procedural and substantive aspects of the case.
Special masters may be particularly valuable in tort cases which
demand case management plans. My experience in this area consists
of the appointment of special masters to develop a uniform pretrial
and apportionment of damages plan in asbestos litigation. 33 The spe-
cial masters assisted me in establishing guidelines and standardized
forms for discovery, and in collecting plaintiff profiles and settlement
figures. Each of these will ultimately assist in the timely resolution of
30. Id 53(b).
31. Id Rule 53(b) states in pertinent part: "A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made
only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury . . . a
reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition re-
quires it." Id
For a discussion of cases appropriate for reference to master under rule 53(b), see
5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.05 (2d ed. 1984).
32. Ste FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c).
33. See genera/ly JUDGE T.D. LAMBROS, OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION CASE
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVOLUTION APPORTIONMENT PROCESS (N.D. Ohio
1983). Judge Lambros's order of appointment directed the Special Masters, Profes-
sors Eric Green and Francis McGovern, "to propose a plan for the management of
the pretrial and trial phases of [the asbestos] cases." Id at 3. The order further
stated:
In carrying out this mandate, the Special Masters are directed to familiarize
themselves with the cases filed and to study the various methods, models
and systems that have been suggested or may be developed by the various
national groups studying the asbestos litigation problem and by other
judges, legal scholars, and interested parties. The Special Masters shall also
meet with the representatives of the interested parties in a manner they
deem appropriate, including meetings exparle, in order to ensure that they
have the benefit of all available input in making their recommendations.
They may schedule and preside over discovery proceedings and examine
and inspect all data, facts, documents and other materials relevant to their
appointment. They may act to coordinate all proceedings not otherwise
agreed to by the parties. The Special Masters may adopt appropriate rules
and procedures to accomplish their task efficiently and fairly.
The Special Masters shall draft their recommendations for the han-
dling of these cases, provide an opportunity for interested parties to com-
ment, and submit final recommendations to me. . . with a plan to manage
the pretrial and trial phases of these cases and any formulations by which
settlement may be achieved.
Id at 4.
1372 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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complicated litigation, while the court's resources are preserved so
that other pressing matters may be addressed.
Additionally, a court may appoint neutral experts. 34 Such ex-
perts provide an alternative means of addressing problems occasioned
by conflicting expert testimony presented by the parties in particu-
larly complex cases. Like special masters, neutral advisors assist in
clarifying issues so that a speedy and just resolution may be reached.
In late 1981, I appointed a neutral economic expert to assist in
the settlement of a consumer class action against the major retail gro-
cery companies in northeastern Ohio. 35 After thoroughly analyzing
the mass of economic data presented by the parties' experts concern-
ing damages, 36 the neutral expert was instrumental in effectuating a
$20 million settlement.
Although I recognize that special masters and neutral experts
should not be appointed in every case, I am surprised that courts have
rarely employed them to manage complex litigation. My experience
has been that in complex cases they can provide valuable assistance to
the court and facilitate settlement.
B. Summary Jury Trial
The summary jury trial is an alternative method of dispute reso-
lution which I developed in 1980.37 The summary jury trial provides
a no-risk method by which the parties can obtain the perception of six
jurors on the merits of their case in the course of a half-day proceed-
ing. This preview gives the parties a reliable basis upon which to
build a mutually acceptable settlement.
38
34. See FED. R. EvID. 706. See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 3.40
(1982) (sample pretrial order for appointment of an expert).
35. See Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F.Supp. 1, 4
(N.D.Ohio 1982) (faced with the inability of either side to agree on underlying fac-
tual assumptions the court found it necessary to appoint its own advisor in order to
interpret the data fairly).
36. Id. at 9-12.
37. For a detailed description of the summary jury trial, see generally Lambros
& Shunk, supra note 8. See also T.D. LAMBROS, THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AND
OTHER ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, A REPORT TO THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF
THE JURY SYSTEM 7-16, Appendix B (1984).
38. See generally Lambros and Shunk, supra note 8. In the Northern District of
Ohio, the use of summary jury trial is authorized by a local rule which provides that
"[t]he Judge may, in his or her discretion, set any appropriate civil case for Summary
Jury Trial or other alternative methods of dispute resolution, as he or she may
choose." See N.D. OHIO Loc. R. 17.02.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the summary jury trial in a similar fashion. In
the United States District Court for the District of Montana, for example, the sum-
mary jury trial is provided for by Standing Order:
13731983-841
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The summary jury trial draws its format from our traditional
civil litigation system, including trial before one's peers. In this re-
spect, it is unique among alternative dispute resolution devices.
39
Stated simply, a summary jury trial consists of counsel's
presentations of their views of the case to a jury and the jury's subse-
quent decision based on the presentations. It is an amalgam of open-
ing and closing arguments with an overview of the expected trial
proofs. Counsel may restate the anticipated testimony of trial wit-
nesses and are free to present exhibits for the jury. Because of the
nonbinding nature of the proceedings, evidentiary and procedural
rules are few and flexible. Counsel are encouraged to develop formats
of presentation which are particularly suitable to the facts of their
case. Tactical maneuvering is kept to a minimum. The summary
jury trial proceeding itself is normally concluded in a half day, and
will rarely last longer than a full day. The proceeding is presided
over by either the judge or a magistrate upon assignment by the
judge.
I developed the summary jury trial as a result of my perception
that there is a certain class of cases in which the only bar to settlement
among the parties is the difference in opinion of how a jury will per-
ceive evidence adduced at trial. An attorney and his client may feel
that a jury's perception of liability and damages may be more
favorable than any settlement that could be reached in pretrial nego-
tiation. This uncertainty is frequently present in cases involving a
"reasonableness" standard of liability, where no amount ofjudicial or
legal interpretation of the standard of liability will assist the parties in
resolving the case. Additionally, there is frequently an attitude on the
part of the parties that they want their "day in court" in order to
satisfy their need to tell their story to someone. The summary jury
trial can eliminate all of these barriers to settlement.
The summary jury trial is designed to provide a method by
Summary Trial is a new pre-trial procedure to be used occasionally in
cases assigned to the Court's docket. Although new to the American Judi-
cial process, this procedural undertaking has as its foundation Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules, "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civl Procedure and the inherent power of the Court to control the docket,
the following rules are adopted for the orderly presentation of Summary
Trial ....
STANDING ORDER No. 6A SUMMARY TRIAL (D. Mont. 1983), reprinted in T.D. LAM-
BROS, supra note 37, Appendix E.
39. While there is no alternative dispute resolution device similar to the sum-
mary jury trial in the United States, the West German Stuttgart Model bears some
similarities. See Cooke, supra note 8, at 619-20.
1374 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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which the parties can obtain the opinions of a jury without the ex-
pense and time commitment that usually accompanies the jury trial.
The result is nonbinding and in no way alters the parties' rights to a
full trial on the merits. A summary jury trial, however, typically
meets the courtroom objectives of litigants while guiding them to-
ward an equitable pretrial settlement. This tendency may be attrib-
uted to the summary jury process itself, which reveals to the parties a
jury's perception of their dispute. This unique perception provides
guidance in the review of demands and the determination of accepta-
ble compromises.
The summary jury trial is rooted in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 16(c)(7) provides that "the participants at any pre-
trial conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to . . .the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial
procedures to resolve the dispute. '40 The Advisory Committee notes,
which elaborate on this concept, state in pertinent part:
Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in
savings to the litigants and the judicial system, settlement
should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as
possible. Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16([c]) (7) to
impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is
believed that providing a neutral forum for discussing the
subject might foster it. . . .For instance, a judge to whom a
case has been assigned may arrange, on his own motion or
at a party's request, to have settlement conferences handled
by another member of the court or by a magistrate.
4
1
The concept of the summary jury trial is also analogous to the
advisory jury proceeding authorized by rule 39(c). 42 Admittedly, that
rule provides for an advisory jury only in cases not triable as of right
by jury. The clear purpose behind the rule, however, is to give the
court and the parties the opportunity to use a jury's particular exper-
tise and perceptions when a case demands those special abilities. In
the summary trial, the court is similarly calling upon jurors to pro-
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committe note (citation omitted).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Rule 39(c) provides as follows:
In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of
its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, except in ac-
tions against the United States when a statute of the United States provides
for trial without a jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may
order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury
had been a matter of right.
1983-841 1375
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vide their peculiar expertise in a situation where that expertise is vital
but not provided for by present civil procedure.
The summary jury trial process itself is relatively simple. Gener-
ally, cases in which settlement cannot be achieved during pretrial
conferences due to differing perceptions of how a jury would evaluate
the evidence are cases that are ripe for summary jury trial. Flexibility
and insight on the part of the judge is a key aspect of making this
determination.
Summary jury trial should not be limited to negligence actions,
nor by the presence of multiple plaintiffs or defendants. While its use
in negligence actions has proven very effective, the process has also
proven useful in contract, personal injury, products liability, discrimi-
nation, admiralty, and antitrust actions. Surprisingly, summary trial
has proven to be a particularly effective means of settling complex
cases. Wherever a factual issue is in dispute, and the parties cannot
resolve the dispute without going to trial, the summary jury trial is
highly recommended as a final step prior to actual trial.
Additionally, the amount of relief sought should not be a limit-
ing factor. This is not to say that every case should be preceded by a
summary jury trial. Careful judicial evaluation is the best method of
making the determination of which case will proceed to a summary
jury trial.
The process itself may be presided over by a judge or magistrate.
For the summary jury trial to be truly effective, the case must be
ready for trial. Discovery should be complete, and any last minute
motions should be decided at a conference held shortly before the
start of the actual summary jury trial proceeding.
When the court schedules the summary jury trial, it should dis-
tribute to counsel materials that explain the summary jury trial pro-
cess. Counsel will then be fully prepared and know what to expect
when they enter the courtroom.
Within a specified time before the summary jury trial, counsel
should be required to submit a trial brief on issues of law and a set of
proposed jury instructions. The amount of information, or briefs, re-
quired by any one judge may vary from court to court or even from
case to case. The court should establish and notify counsel of any
specific requirements within a sufficient time so that there are no
delays.
It is essential that the parties, or a representative of each party
with settlement authority, be present at the summary jury trial. The
summary jury trial is being conducted for them; their presence should
only be excused by leave of court.
1376 [Vol. 29: p. 1363
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just prior to the summary jury trial, the court calls a jury venire
of a sufficient number to provide a jury of six. The members of the
jury pool, after being given a brief description of the case, the parties,
and the attorneys involved, are instructed to complete juror profile
forms. The completed forms are subsequently copied and distributed
to the presiding judicial officer and to the attorneys. A brief voir dire
is then conducted after which counsel may make their peremptory
challenges, usually two for each side. Typically, summary jury trial
voir dire and preliminary remarks of the judge are both concluded in
about fifteen minutes.
The attorneys for each side have one hour each to present all of
their evidence. They may incorporate their arguments into their evi-
dentiary summarizations. If requested by counsel, the court may
break up the hour period to permit rebuttal.
After counsel have presented their cases, the presiding judicial
officer gives the jury an abbreviated charge and the jury then retires.
The jury may return a consensus verdict or individual verdicts that
list each juror's perception of liability and damages. The parties or
the court may submit interrogatories to the jury. On occasion it has
been enlightening to permit the attorneys to question the jurors, and
vice versa, after a verdict has been returned.
The results of this procedure in the Northern District of Ohio
have been gratifying. Recent statistics indicate that over ninety per-
cent of the cases selected for summary jury trial thus far have settled,
either before or after going through the actual process. Of those cases
that have gone through the actual process the figure is even higher.
43
Based on the average length and cost of ajury trial in the North-
ern District of Ohio, the summary jury trial, when successful, saves
approxiamately $1,504.12 for each case that does not proceed to full
trial on the merits.4 4 In addition to the lower costs, litigants, experts,
and other witnesses save a considerable amount of time by not having
to go through protracted jury trials.
Use of the process in other federal courts throughout the country
is increasing. Since its inception, the process has been used in federal
courts in Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Other federal courts in Ohio are con-
ducting summary jury trials. It is particularly encouraging that state
and federal courts throughout the United States have expressed inter-
43. See T.D. LAMBROS, supra note 37, at 16-17.
44. Id at 19.
1983-84] 1377
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est in and support for summary jury trials.45
IV. CONCLUSION
In the 1980's and beyond, judges must direct their primary ef-
forts toward supporting the present judicial system rather than re-
placing it. Judges must develop alternative methods of dispute
resolution in order to improve the present system. If we are to pre-
serve our system of trial by jury from the potentially damaging effects
of overcrowding, we must have the ability to be certain that only
those disputes which cannot be resolved in any manner are the ones
that proceed to full trial. It is in this context that the bench and the
bar must work together to implement existing alternative methods of
dispute resolution and to take bold initiatives to establish other meth-
ods that can support our system. Judges and attorneys need vision
and foresight to make the best use of the resources already available
to them so that they can preserve our existing system as it faces the
challenges ahead.
The final test of whether the American judicial system should
adopt a particular method of dispute resolution focuses on whether
that method increases the efficiency of the system without impinging
on its basic fairness. A system of judge-managed alternative methods
of dispute resolution which is integrated into the existing pre-
trial/trial system provides such an efficient means of fostering settle-
ment in a manner that is wholly consistent with due process.
45. At its September 1984 meeting, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED: The Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use
of summary jury trial as a potentially effective means of promoting fair and
equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury cases.
Letter from Robert Loesche, Ass't. Gen. Counsel, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, to
Hon. Thomas D. Lambros (Oct. 2, 1984).
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